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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
Nos. 07-3376 & 07-4598
___________
JOAN T. KLOTH,
                                          Appellant
v.
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY;
 BOARD OF DIRECTORS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-00244)
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 16, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges





Pro se litigant Joan T. Kloth appeals from the dismissal of her complaint for lack
of personal jurisdiction and the denial of her motion for reconsideration by the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware.  We agree with the District Court that
2Kloth did not allege facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Defendants. 
We will affirm.
I.
Sometime between April 2000 and September 2001, while domiciled in
Connecticut, Kloth learned about Southern Christian University’s  (“SCU”) distance
learning program for obtaining a dual masters degree in Marriage and Family Therapy
and Professional Counseling.  SCU, a higher education university whose main campus is
in Montgomery, Alabama, operates a “distance learning program” in which students
complete all of the course work for the program online.  The program also requires
completion of a certain number of clinical hours to obtain their final degree.
Kloth contacted SCU’s Graduate Advisor for the School of Human Services who
advised her that she could complete her Masters degree in two years and one course if she
attended full-time, taking three to four courses per semester.  Kloth specifically inquired
about SCU’s pending Commission on Accreditation for Marriage and Family Therapy
Education (“COAMFTE”) and whether her non-Christian affiliation was an issue and was
assured by email that the school was accredited and, by the time of her graduation, would
be COAMFTE certified.  She was also assured that her religious affiliation would not be
an issue.  
In January 2002, Kloth enrolled in the program and began taking courses from her
home in Connecticut, communicating with SCU’s administrators and professors by phone
3and email.  From January 2002 through February 2005, Kloth took 15 online classes. 
During the spring of 2003, Kloth began searching for a training site where she could
fulfill the clinical hours she needed to complete her degree.  SCU did not assist Kloth in
this process, advising her that it was the student’s sole responsibility to find a clinical site. 
Although she found many sites, none would accept her—apparently because of the
distance learning aspect of her program and because of the school’s unwillingness to
communicate with the training sites.  
In early 2003, Kloth informed her classmates and her professors about her Jewish
faith.  As a result, she began experiencing problems with two Christian students and with
two professors who Kloth felt were disrespecting her.  
In or about February 2005, Kloth moved to Delaware to continue searching for a
clinical training site as part of her required course work.  Despite her repeated attempts
and large number of inquiries, Kloth was unsuccessful in finding a clinical placement. 
She took two more classes online through the SCU distance learning program, but
ultimately discontinued her studies at SCU, in or about August 2005.  
Kloth brought suit against SCU and its Board of Directors (collectively
“Defendants”) in the District of Delaware.  She alleges that Defendants breached an
implied contract to provide her with a complete education.  She also alleges discrimination
on the basis of religion, presumably in violation of Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights
Act of 1964.  
4The District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.  This appeal followed.
II.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, engaging in plenary review
of the District Court’s personal jurisdiction determination.  See Yarris v. County of Del.,
465 F.3d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 2006); IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 258 (3d
Cir. 1998).  We review the District Court’s denial of reconsideration for abuse of
discretion.  See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004).  
III.
For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, that defendant must
have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state, such that subjecting the
defendant to the court’s jurisdiction “comports with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”  See Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451 (3d Cir.
2003) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).  When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must establish at least a prima facie case for personal
jurisdiction, with all of plaintiff’s allegations taken as true and all factual disputes resolved
in her favor.  See Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004).  
A two-prong analysis is applied to determine whether a plaintiff has carried her
burden.  First, the court considers whether service was authorized by statute, in this case
     The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “a federal district court may assert1
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the state in which the court sits to the extent
authorized by the law of that state.”  Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987).  The Delaware long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. §
3104(c), confers jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the due process
clause.  See LaNuova D&B S.p.A. v. Bowe Co., 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986).  
5
under Delaware’s long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104.   IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 258-59. 1
If the state statutory requirements are met, the court determines whether exercise of
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant satisfies due process by considering whether
sufficient minimum contacts have occurred between the forum state and the defendant.  Id.
at 259. 
Delaware’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident who, either in person or through an agent:
(1) Transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State;
(2) Contracts to supply services or things in this State;
* * * 
(4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or omission
outside the State if the person regularly does or solicits business, engages in any
other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from
services, or things used or consumed in the State; . . . .
10 Del. C. § 3104(c).  Delaware courts interpret §§ 3104(c)(1), (c)(2), as specific
jurisdiction sections, requiring that some action by the defendant occur within Delaware. 
See LaNuova, 513 A.2d at 768; Outokumpu Eng’g Enters., Inc. v. Kvaerner EnviroPower,
Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 729 (Del. 1996).  Section 3104(c)(4) is interpreted as a general
jurisdiction provision, meaning the defendant’s contacts with the forum state may be
unrelated to the alleged injury.  See LaNuova, 513 A.2d at 768.
     Specifically, she claims that Defendants transact business and perform services when2
they deliver their educational product to students residing in Delaware.  Defendants
accept student papers and tests, grade them and return them to students via the Internet. 
She claims Defendants satisfy (2) because they breached the implied contract that they
had entered with her for the provision of educational services and degree award.  Finally,
Kloth argues that (4) is satisfied because Defendants delivered educational services to her
in Delaware, and were aware of her residence there. 
6
Kloth claims that Defendants satisfy sections (1), (2) and (4).   Kloth does not2
dispute that Defendants’ contacts with Delaware consist of Defendants’ Web site which is
accessible nationwide, Kloth’s temporary residence in Delaware during a portion of her
studies, and one other SCU student’s residence.  The issue is whether these contacts are
sufficient to satisfy Delaware’s long-arm statute.  
A. Specific Jurisdiction
“Specific jurisdiction exists when the claim arises from or relates to conduct
purposely directed at the forum state.”  Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir.
2007) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 &
n.8 (1984)).  Here, the District Court properly considered whether SCU’s Web site was
specifically designed to interact with residents of Delaware and concluded that Appellants
had not “purposefully availed” themselves of doing business with Delaware citizens. 
(App. at A-19-20 (citing Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 452).)
Kloth argues that the District Court erred in its interpretation of Zippo
Manufacturing. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125-28 (W.D. Pa. 1997),
one of the seminal authorities regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of
7an Internet Web site.  See Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 452.  The court in Zippo stressed that
whether jurisdiction is proper “depends on where on a sliding scale of commercial
interactivity the web site falls.”  Id.  Where a defendant is “clearly doing business through
its web site in the forum state, and where the claim relates to or arises out of use of the
web site, the Zippo court held that personal jurisdiction exists.”  Id. (citing Zippo, 952 F.
Supp. at 1124).  To make this determination, the Zippo court focused on whether the
interactivity of a commercial Web site reflects “purposeful availment” or intended
interaction with residents of the forum state.  See id. (citation omitted).  Purposeful
availment is demonstrated when a defendant “(1) directs electronic activity into the State,
(2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other interactions within the
State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within the State, a potential cause of action
cognizable in the State’s courts.”  Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 453 (citation omitted).  
Kloth claims that SCU’s Web site satisfies the test in Zippo because it is
“interactive.”  Specifically, she argues that SCU’s use of a proprietary software dubbed
“Blackboard” facilitated the correspondence between Kloth, her professors and her
classmates.  However, to demonstrate a prima facie case for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction, Kloth must show more than mere interactivity; she must also show that, by
using software that facilitates distance learning, SCU intended to engage in business with
student citizens of Delaware—the forum state.  
Kloth’s reliance on Zippo is unavailing.  The defendant in Zippo sold passwords to
8approximately 3,000 subscribers in Pennsylvania and entered into seven contracts with
Internet access providers to furnish its services to customers in Pennsylvania.  By contrast,
here there is no evidence that SCU targeted its Web site to potential students in Delaware,
nor that the school engaged in business with any one in Delaware other than Kloth and one
other student.  The existence of Blackboard demonstrates only that SCU intends to allow
its students to attend classes and communicate with their classmates and professors when
they are not at SCU’s physical campus. 
As the District Court observed, although SCU certainly could have foreseen that
students from Delaware, or any other state, might choose to participate in their distance
learning program because the Web site is accessible to a nationwide (indeed, global)
audience, this foreseeability alone cannot satisfy the purposeful availment requirement. 
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (noting that
“foreseeability” alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction
under the Due Process Clause).  Thus, Kloth has failed to demonstrate a prima facie case
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on Delaware’s long-arm statute, §
3104(c)(1).   
Subsection (c)(2) allows a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over defendants if
they contracted to provide services or things in Delaware.  However, as previously noted,
there is no evidence that SCU intended to provide educational services specific to
Delaware citizens.  See Mendelson v. Del. River & Bay Auth., 56 F. Supp. 2d 436, 438-49
     Kloth did not contest any of the facts put forth by SCU in support of its motion to3
dismiss before the District Court, nor does she do so in her brief before this Court.  
9
(D. Del. 1999) (finding specific jurisdiction where company contracted to provide a
custom-made set of fire doors designed specifically for a Delaware ferry).  In Mendelson,
the court found that the defendant “did not simply contract to supply a generic or fungible
set of mass-produced doors which could fit into any frame in any wall in any ship or
building in the nation,” but instead knew “that the doors were going to be installed in a
vessel that was going to not only be moored or anchored in the State but also transport cars
and passengers within Delaware territorial waters.”  Id.  Here, even assuming SCU knew
Kloth had temporarily moved to Delaware during her studies, Kloth has not proffered
evidence that SCU purposely targeted the contents of their Web site or other distance
learning materials toward Delaware citizens.  Indeed, she does not dispute that she
initiated her enrollment in SCU while domiciled in Connecticut, and only moved to
Delaware on a temporary basis several years later.   Indeed, SCU’s records show Kloth’s3
address to be Connecticut during her entire enrollment.  Apparently, Kloth never changed
her records to reflect her move to Delaware.  
Because Kloth has not met her prima facie burden, the District Court properly
dismissed her claim for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to a specific jurisdiction
theory.  
B. General Jurisdiction 
For substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, we agree that Defendants’
     Because Defendants do not have sufficient contacts with Delaware to meet the4
requirements of Delaware’s long-arm statute, § 3104(c), we need not proceed to the
second part of the analysis, examining whether the assertion of jurisdiction comports with
the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
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maintenance of a Web site that posts information about the school and is accessible to
potential students in foreign jurisdictions is insufficient to subject a non-resident defendant
to general jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Gehling v. St. George’s Sch. of Med., Ltd., 773 F.2d
539, 541-42 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that St. George’s School of Medicine, a West Indies
institution, did not have a sufficient nexus to Pennsylvania to subject the school to general
jurisdiction, despite the fact that St. George’s advertised in national newspapers that
circulated in Pennsylvania; counted Pennsylvania residents among its student body; sent
school representatives to Philadelphia as part of a “media swing” intended to raise St.
George’s profile; and entered into an agreement with a Pennsylvania college to establish a
joint international program combining pre-medical studies in Pennsylvania with medical
training in Grenada); see also Gallant v. Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of N.Y., 111 F.
Supp. 2d 638 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Park v. Oxford Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal.
1997), aff’d, Park v. Oxford Univ., 165 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 1998); Hardnett v. Duquesne
Univ., 897 F. Supp. 920 (D. Md. 1995); Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D.
Ill. 1990),  rev’d in part on other grounds, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).4
Because our affirmance is based on a lack of jurisdiction, rather than on the merits,
it is without prejudice to the Appellant’s right to move in the District Court for a transfer
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406.  See Goldlawr, Inc., Heiman, 369 U.S.C. 463 (1962);
11
Schwilm v. Holbrook, 661 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1981).  Indeed, the District Court’s conclusion
that there is no personal jurisdiction does not preclude its authority to transfer the case for
venue reasons.  28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); see also Lafferty v. St. Riel, 495 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir.
2007).  
C. Motion for Reconsideration
Finally, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Kloth’s motion for reconsideration.  United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d
Cir. 1992).  The Court’s October 17, 2007 Memorandum Order thoroughly considered
Kloth’s arguments in support of her motion and properly concluded that she had failed to
demonstrate that the new facts alleged constituted “new evidence that was not available”
when the court issued its July 16, 2007 memorandum opinion, that a change in controlling
law occurred, or that any other clear error of law or fact occurred.  Max’s Seafood Café ex
rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (the purpose of a motion
for reconsideration is to “correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.”).  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Kloth’s
motion to file a supplemental brief is granted.  Appellees’ motion to strike Kloth’s
supplemental filing is denied.  Kloth’s motion to change venue is denied.  Kloth’s motions
entitled “Motion to Include the Federal Education, House and Senate Bill Definitions for
Distance Learning related to the Higher Education Act” and “Motion to Include the
Distance Education Demonstration Project of 1998,” construed as motions to supplement
or amend her brief, are denied.
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